Dedekind's proof of the Cantor-Bernstein theorem is based on his chain theory, not on Cantor's wellordering principle. A careful analysis of the proof extracts an argument structure that can be seen in the many other proofs that have been given since. I contend there is essentially one proof that comes in two variants due to Dedekind and Zermelo, respectively. This paper is a case study in analysing proofs of a single theorem within a given methodological framework, here Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF). It uses tools from proof theory, but focuses on heuristic ideas that shape proofs and on logical strategies that help to construct them. It is rooted in a perspective on Beweistheorie that predates its close connection and almost exclusive attention to the goals of Hilbert's finitist consistency programme. This earlier perspective can be brought to life (only) with the support of powerful computational tools.
This article is part of the theme issue 'The notion of 'simple proof' -Hilbert's 24th problem'.
Context
The Cantor-Bernstein theorem (CBT) or Schröder-Bernstein theorem or, simply, the Equivalence theorem asserts the existence of a bijection between two sets a and b, assuming there are injections f and g from a to b and from b to a, respectively. Dedekind [1] was the first to prove the theorem without appealing to Cantor's wellordering principle in a manuscript from 1887. The proof was published with a Note of Emmy Noether in the third volume of his Gesammelte mathematische Werke [2] . In a letter of 29 August 1899, Dedekind communicated a slightly different proof to Cantor; the letter was included in Cantor's Gesammelte Abhandlungen with Zermelo as editor [3] . Zermelo mentions in his Note to the
Dedekind's fundamental lemma
The core of Dedekind's considerations is reflected in the proof of his fundamental lemma. Fundamental lemma: Let h be a bijection from a to e and let d be a set with e ⊆ d ⊆ a; then there is a bijection from a to d.
The equivalence of the fundamental lemma to the CBT is easily established. Assume CBT as formulated in §1. The bijection h between a and e yields, by simply changing its co-domain to d, an injection from a to d; analogously, the identity on d yields, again by changing its co-domain to a, an injection from d to a. CBT guarantees the existence of a bijection between a and d. Conversely, assume the fundamental lemma. The composition g • f of f and g is a bijection between a and
⊆ a. Thus, the fundamental lemma gives a bijection between a and g [b] ; composing this bijection with the inverse of g (that is a bijection between g [b] and b) yields a bijection between a and b.
A diagrammatic presentation of the consideration underlying Dedekind's proof of the fundamental lemma is given in figure 1 . Taking for granted the possibility of making explicit the set c that is obtained from a\d by finitely iterating h, one defines A modification of this proof establishes that there is a bijection h* from d to e. Let c* be the set obtained from d\e by finitely iterating h; define h* from d to e by h*(x) = h(x) if x is in c* and h*(x) = id(x) if x is in d\c* (figure 2). The composition of h with the inverse of h* is a bijection h** from a to d. This bijection can be directly defined by exploiting c* as follows: h**(x) = h(x) if x is in a\c* and h**(x) = id(x) otherwise. This is Zermelo's argument for the Equivalence theorem. Note that for the two arguments above (and also for König's below) the important case arises when a\d and d\e are non-empty; otherwise, the identity on a, respectively the given bijection h, can be taken as the sought-after bijection. 4 König's proof was published in [6] ; his informal argument is presented rigorously in ( [19] , p. 55). Adapted to my set up, it is seen to join the earlier considerations using both c and c* (figure 3.)
It is not difficult to verify that h 1 * is the h* from Dedekind's proof and that h 2 * is the h** from Zermelo's proof. Here are the definitions side by side:
We have only to observe that, in the first case, a\c = c* ∪ r and, in the second case, a\c* = c ∪ r. h* and h** are the canonical mappings that are obtained also in all the other proofs I have analysed. 5 There are two important and problematic issues in the above arguments; first, we have to find for the informally described sets c and c* an explicit set-theoretic definition and, second, we have to prove the structural identities. If one defines c 'from below' as
. This approximation of c from below is the central construction in Bernstein's proof [21] . Its standard diagrammatic presentation, as given for example in [22, pp. 11-12] , can be adapted as in figure 4 for the proof of Dedekind's fundamental lemma in the following way, because d is a subset of a.
The bijection h*:
. However, Dedekind wanted to avoid any appeal to natural numbers in the development of his general theory of chains; after all, the natural numbers were to be founded on it. Once the natural numbers had been given a chain-theoretic characterization, Dedekind established that the approximation from below and above (as the intersection of all chains containing a\d and closed under h) yield the same set. 6 The latter characterization is going to be discussed next to address the two problematic and deeply related issues I just pointed to: an explicit set-theoretic definition of c and c* as well as the proof of the structural identities. 
Chains and formal proofs
Dedekind and Zermelo used chains of a given system s ⊆ a to capture the set that is obtained from s by finitely iterating the bijective function h. This way of proceeding does not take for granted the natural numbers. (However, see footnote 6.) In Dedekind's case, the chain of a\d given h is defined as ∩ {x ⊆ a | a\d ⊆ x and h[x] ⊆ x}, i.e. as the smallest subset of a that contains a\d and is closed under h. It is a non-trivial task to establish the structural identity when c is defined in this way; Dedekind of course addressed and solved the problem (in theorems #57 and #58 of WZ).
A directly related way of making the inductively defined set c explicit is Knaster and Tarski's fixed-point construction. Consider the mapping m from
; m is a monotone operation and has a smallest as well as a largest fixed-point [24] . 7 The smallest fixed-point of m is defined by I have discussed a number of proofs of Dedekind's fundamental lemma and isolated the central ideas. How 'different' are these proofs?-How can we analyse the differences or similarities between the proofs in greater detail? To answer this question, we built a formal framework that is, on the one hand, perfectly precise and, on the other hand, sufficiently flexible to reflect the structure of argumentation in mathematical practice. The basic axiomatic framework is the Zermelo-Fraenkel system ZF for set theory; clearly, other methodological frameworks could be chosen for this kind of work. The logical inference mechanism is a version of Gentzen's natural deduction calculus that allows the bi-directional construction of partial proofs in pure logic and, thus, reasoning with gaps. These intercalation proofs are represented as partial Fitch diagrams. The completed or full proofs, when strategically constructed, are easily seen to be normal proofs in natural deduction. 8 The meaning of the logical connectives is expressed through introduction and elimination rules; these considerations are extended from connectives to defined notions and operations in order to develop a hierarchy of definitional extensions for ZF.
Those are the bases for natural formalization. In addition to exploiting logical strategies, it builds connections between the conceptual organization and the construction of proofs via the use of lemmas as rules. The most relevant lemmas are of a simple logical form, just universally quantified conditionals whose antecedents are conjunctions. These connections can also be formed in a bidirectional way. If the hypotheses of a lemma have been proved individually, then the lemma justifies immediately the step to the conclusion in the 'top-down' or 'forward' direction. If a particular statement is to be proved by a selected lemma, then the hypotheses of the lemma are new proof obligations in the 'bottom-up' or 'backward' direction. The interaction of building a conceptual framework and carrying out formal proofs is quite dynamic, even after the central line of the informal argument has been articulated: it faces the very same issues that have to be addressed by any attempt to organize a mathematical argument in the most perspicuous way.
The final proof of the CBT is the pinnacle of the natural formalization. The lemmas, to which the proof appeals and which go beyond the fundamental lemma, are listed in appendix A and are rather direct observations. Here is the formal proof of CBT, where 1(g • f ) denotes the composition of f and g, when its co-domain is restricted to the image of its domain:
The additional lemmas, appealed to on lines 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8, do not at all touch the central considerations that lead to the fundamental lemma. 
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The construction begins with the partial proof consisting of the premises 1-2 and the goal 22. To allow the introduction of a (temporary) name for the complex term ¢(a,b,h) denoting the chain of the system b given a and h, we employ the theorem in 3 and apply the elimination rules for the existential quantifier and for identity to obtain the partial proof with lines 1-4 and 20-22.
Here is where the core of the proof begins, namely, to establish the identity in 20. That leads to two new goals with gaps, thus to the partial proof: 1-4 . . . gap1 . . . 9 . . . gap2 . . . [19] [20] [21] [22] . The reader, I hope, is now in a position to see how these new gaps are closed and how the proof of the structural identity is completed. Given the earlier diagrammatic summary of the two parallel ways of obtaining the CBT from the structural identity, it seems that the multitude of proofs of the theorem has been reduced to essentially one proof by analysing crucial concepts and related techniques. This case study presents proof-theoretic investigations that are quite different from the standard ones (in pursuit of modified Hilbert programmes). Nevertheless, it uses crucial insights from the traditional work and not only opens new directions rooted in the earlier work, but actually takes up deep programmatic themes.
Programmatic directions
For his Paris list of mathematical problems, Hilbert had prepared a 24th problem that was not included in their final publication [10] . As mentioned already in §1, this hastily formulated problem called for the development of 'a theory of the method of proof in mathematics in general'. Hilbert made the bold claim that 'under a given set of conditions there can be but one simplest proof', without indicating a notion of simplicity. If there should be two proofs for a theorem, then, The strategic conceptual necessity underlying the proofs of the fundamental lemma has to be distinguished from the mathematical set-theoretic necessity of defining the set that is obtained by finitely iterating an operation. The strategic conceptual necessity is realized through the two variant conditions that separate Dedekind's from Zermelo's proof. As far as the other necessity is concerned, three aids have been exploited to find explicit set-theoretic definitions: Bernstein's approximation from below, Dedekind's approximation from above, and the Knaster-Tarski fixedpoint construction. The first way requires the availability of the natural numbers, whereas the second and third approaches yield exactly the same two sets, c and c*.
In his Zürich talk of September 1917, Hilbert implicitly resumed the project outlined in the 24th problem and called for the investigation of 'the concept of the specifically mathematical proof'. It was clear that the logical calculi Frege, Peano, Whitehead and Russell had developed would play a crucial role in such an investigation. In lectures of the winter term 1917/18, Hilbert & Bernays [27] used the Principia Mathematica calculus when sketching the formal development of number theory and analysis. As the sustained formal work was far too unwieldy, they introduced in early 1922 a novel logical calculus with two explicit goals. The first goal was methodological, whereas the second was entirely pragmatic:
(1) formulate a group of characteristic axioms for each logical connective and fix in this way the logically relevant meaning of connectives, 9 and (2) make it easier to formalize mathematical arguments as well as to guarantee the intelligibility of the formal object representing the informal proof.
Gentzen's natural deduction systems are rule-based versions of the Hilbert-Bernays calculi, but introduce one completely new feature: making and discharging assumptions. Gentzen viewed that feature as an essential reflection of mathematical practice. A subclass of proofs in natural deduction calculi, so-called normal ones that do not make detours, have most striking structural properties, among them the subformula property. 10 As there was no direct way of generating normal proofs similar to that of generating cut-free proofs in sequent calculi, the question was: How can those properties be exploited for shaping a search for proofs? Intercalation calculi address exactly this problem. The systematic bi-directional use of elimination and introduction rules underlies the completeness proof for these calculi and produces either normal proofs or allows the formulation of a counterexample. The structural features of normal proofs motivate particular strategic moves to make proof search efficient and always goal-directed.
Let us return to Hilbert's 24th problem and the question, when two proofs in mathematics should be considered to be the same. Recall that Noether viewed Dedekind's and Zermelo's proofs as 'exactly the same'. If Beweistheorie is to be a theory of mathematical arguments then, ultimately, one has to find a criterion that relates the identity of proofs to the literal identity of syntactic configurations. The latter are, or have been obtained from, formal representatives of the two proofs. That raises, of course, the question when a formal derivation can be viewed as representing an informal proof. Neither the question of proof representation nor the topic of proof identity can be addressed, I think, without reference to a conceptually organized framework and proof search within it. In sum, (informal) proof representation and (formal) proof identity are always relative to a framework and proof search procedure. Given such a framework, natural formalization crucially complements strategic search by building connections to the framework. The connections are of roughly two kinds, namely observations concerning important notions and heuristic ideas. Both kinds are expressed through lemmas.
We distinguish, consequently, at least three components of natural formalization: (i) strategic (sequences of) steps using the introduction and elimination rules associated with connectives and definitions, (ii) syntactically motivated connections to the background conceptual organization, and (iii) heuristics or leading ideas for addressing classes of problems. The strategic approach (i) is based on the syntactic structure of assumptions and goals and has, of course, its limits. The components of kind (ii) are exemplified by the lemmas used in the top-level proof of the CBT (and listed in appendix A). They are easy observations for anyone who understands the mathematical concepts involved. By contrast, the components of kind (iii) articulate broader heuristic ideas. In the context of this paper, the technique for showing that two sets a and b are equinumerous falls into this category: partition both a and b into two subsets a 1 , a 2 and b 1 , b 2 and show that the a i and b i , i = 1 or 2, are pairwise equinumerous; thus, a and b are equinumerous. 11 Natural formalization is a dynamic tool to locate significant differences between proofs, to explore criteria for their identity and to raise questions on their simplicity (or complexity). What are the limits of the strategic approach? How do components of kind (ii) and (iii) help to overcome the limits? Those of kind (ii), do they more than keep proofs surveyable and free from excessive low-level formality, or do they have greater cognitive significance? Those of kind (iii), do they reflect different proof ideas? As to simplicity, are the length of proofs and proof search meaningful measures? Should we consider a proof as complex, if it uses a great number of particular logical rules (e.g. indirect steps, existential introductions) or if the containment relation for subderivations is deep? In any event, natural formalization presses us to articulate heuristics and leading ideas when the general strategic approach falters-and that will be extremely useful for the automated search for humanly intelligible proofs.
Here is a wide and open field for fascinating investigations. It can be explored by proof search experiments with essential support of computers, and it can also be connected to traditional reflections on the identity of formal proofs as presented in [32, 33] . In my study [31] , I suggested calling such an expanded proof theory structural for two reasons: on the one hand, one exploits the internal syntactic structure of normal proofs and, on the other hand, one appeals to the framing conceptual structure, including the axiomatic definition of mathematical structures. Formal proofs should be viewed as representatives of ordinary mathematical proofs only when they preserve leading ideas and have been constructed in a strategic way relative to a methodological framework. Of course, the character of this intricate connection is itself a central topic of investigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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